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Abstract
A popular view in contemporary Boltzmannian statistical mechan-
ics is to interpret the measures as typicality measures. In measure-
theoretic dynamical systems theory measures can similarly be inter-
preted as typicality measures. However, a justification why these mea-
sures are a good choice of typicality measures is missing, and the paper
attempts to fill this gap. The paper first argues that Pitowsky’s (2012)
justification of typicality measures does not fit the bill. Then a first
proposal of how to justify typicality measures is presented. The main
premises are that typicality measures are invariant and are related to
the initial probability distribution of interest (which are translation-
continuous or translation-close). The conclusion are two theorems
which show that the standard measures of statistical mechanics and
dynamical systems are typicality measures. There may be other typ-
icality measures, but they agree about judgements of typicality. Fi-
nally, it is proven that if systems are ergodic or epsilon-ergodic, there
are uniqueness results about typicality measures.
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1 Introduction
Consider all the possible states of a system in Boltzmannian statistical me-
chanics. A measure is defined over these states. The main aim of statistical
mechanics is to work as a bridge between the microscopic and macroscopic
levels of description of a system, and the measure is a crucial “level-bridging”
ingredient. An important question in the foundations of Boltzmannian sta-
tistical mechanics is how to interpret this measure. A recent proposal is
that it is best interpreted as a typicality measure: it represents the relative
size of sets of states, and typical states show a certain property if the mea-
sure of the set that corresponds to this property is one or close to one. In
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics the same measure is appealed to in the
equilibrium and non-equilibrium context. Hence the interpretation as a typi-
cality measure is relevant for both contexts. This approach enjoys particular
prominence among contemporary physicists who endorse Boltzmannian sta-
tistical mechanics (Du¨rr 1998; Goldstein 2001; Goldstein and Lebowitz 2004;
Lebowitz 1993a; Lebowitz 1993b; Lebowitz 1999) but has also been advo-
cated by philosophers (Maudlin 2007; Volchan 2007).
Not only in statistical mechanics but also for measure-theoretic dynamical
systems an interpretation needs to be found for the standard measures used,
and one suggestion is to interpret them as typicality measures. Unlike sta-
tistical mechanics, measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory is not con-
cerned with bridging scales of description. Moreover, while statistical me-
chanics is a physical theory, dynamical systems theory is a set of mathe-
matical tools with applications in various sciences (among others, in physics,
chemistry, biology, meteorology and climate science). Furthermore, under-
standing the behaviour of “most” initial conditions was always a central
concern in dynamical systems theory. Hence the notion of typicality does
not cause as much controversy here as in statistical mechanics.
What is missing is a thorough treatment of the question why these mea-
sures are a good choice of typicality measures.1 Witness Volchan (2007, 13):
1Physicists sometimes seem to hold that it is fine to take the standard measures used in
statistical mechanics as a postulate. They might hold such a pragmatic viewpoint because
it does not lead to wrong conclusions for the practical problems they are interested in, and
they do not have time to engage in more thorough foundational debates. Still, philosophers
and some physicists want to arrive at a conceptual understanding of statistical mechanics,
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“Many tough questions are still to be addressed. For example, as typicality
is relative to the measure used, how one justifies a particular choice? Un-
der what criteria?”. This paper attempts to contribute to fill this gap by
presenting a first tentative proposal of how to justify typicality measures in
statistical mechanics and in measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory more
generally. An argument will be called a justification of typicality measures
exactly when (i) the premises imply that there is a unique typicality measure
or a set of typicality measures which agree on which sets are typical/atypical
(here any measure of this set can be used as typicality measure); and (ii) the
premises are at least potentially more plausible than just postulating that
certain measures are a good choice of typicality measures.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Boltzmannian statistical
mechanics and Section 3 introduces measure-theoretic dynamical systems.
Section 4 discusses the notion of typicality. Section 5 outlines Pitowsky’s
(2012) justification of typicality measures, which is the only paper known to
the author which advances a justification of typicality measures of statisti-
cal mechanics and measure-theoretic dynamical systems. Section 6 argues
that Pitowsky’s argument does not fit the bill. Section 7 and 8 present a
first proposal of how to justify typicality measures of Boltzmannian statisti-
cal mechanics and measure-theoretic dynamical systems. Finally, Section 9
shows that if systems are ergodic/epsilon-ergodic, one obtains uniqueness
results about the typicality measures. The paper concludes in Section 10.
2 Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
The concern in this paper is Boltzmannian statistical mechanics2 (SM) and
not Gibbsian SM. (I adopt the common distinction that while Gibbsian SM
is about ensembles, Boltzmannian SM is about a single system. So, e.g.,
equilibrium is associated with a single state in Boltzmannian SM and with
a probability distribution in Gibbsian SM (cf. Frigg 2008; Uffink 1996)).3 In
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics the object of study is a system consist-
and hence are interested in a thorough conceptual motivation of typicality measures.
2For a detailed discussion of Boltzmannian SM see Frigg (2008) and Uffink (2007).
3How Boltzmannian SM relates to Gibbsian SM, and why the very same measures
are used in both frameworks, are deep and interesting foundational questions, which are
beyond the scope of this paper (for more on his issue see Frigg 2008 and Uffink 2007).
4
ing of n classical particles. The boundary conditions assumed here are that
the system is in a bounded container and is isolated from the environment.
The microscopic description is as follows. The microstate of the system
is represented by a point x = (p1, . . . pn, q1, . . . qn), where qi is the (three-
dimensional) position of the i-th particle and pi is the (three-dimensional)
momentum of the i-th particle (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The microstates x are elements
of the 6n-dimensional state space Γ (where Γ represents all possible position
and momentum coordinates of all the particles). Because the energy is con-
served, the motion of the system is confined to a (6n−1)-dimensional energy
hypersurface ΓE, which can be shown to be compact (E is the value of the
energy of the system). The system starts in a certain initial condition – an
initial microstate x. The evolution of the system is governed by Hamilton’s
equations, whose solutions are the phase flow φt on the energy hypersurface
ΓE. That is, φt(x) gives the microstate of the system that started in initial
condition x after t time steps.
The macroscopic description is as follows. Macrostates Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are
characterised by the values of macroscopic parameters such as local pressure
and local temperature. To each macrostate Mi, i = 1, . . . , k (k ∈ N), there
corresponds a macroregion ΓMi which consists of all x ∈ ΓE for which the
macroscopic parameters take values which are characteristic for Mi. The
ΓMi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, do not overlap and jointly cover ΓE.4 Two macrostates are
of particular importance: the equilibrium state Meq and the macrostate at
the beginning of the process Mp. The macroscopic evolution of the system
with initial microstate x is given by Mx(t) = M(φt(x)), where M(y) is the
macrostate corresponding to microstate y.
Regarding the measures of interest in Boltzmannian SM, note that for Hamil-
tonian systems the uniform measure µ defined on Γ (the Lebesgue measure)
is invariant under the dynamics; this result is known as Liouville’s theorem
(Petersen 1983, 5). µ can be restricted to a normalized measure µE on ΓE,
which is also invariant under the dynamics. µE is called the microcanonical
measure and is the standard measure used in Boltzmannian SM. Hence the
question is how to justify µE as typicality measure.
4That is, technically the ΓMi are a partition, meaning that ΓMi ∈ ΣΓE for all i, ΓMi ∩
ΓMj = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪ki=1ΓMi = ΓE .
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Because the same measures are employed in Bolzmannian SM for questions
regarding equilibrium and non-equilibrium, the interpretation as typicality
measure is relevant in both contexts.5 In general, much more is known about
equilibrium SM than non-equilibrium SM.6 In particular, it is a central aim
of non-equilibrium SM to explain thermodynamic-like behaviour, but this
is extremely difficult. To characterise thermodynamic-like behaviour, the
Boltzmann entropy first needs to be introduced. The Boltzmann entropy of a
macrostate Mi is SB(Mi) = kB log(µE(ΓMi)), where kB is the Boltzmann con-
stant; and the Boltzmann entropy of a system at time t is SB(t) = SB(Mx(t)).
It can be shown that for gases the equilibrium macroregion covers nearly all
of ΓE, and hence the Boltzmann entropy is highest in equilibrium. The
macrostate at the beginning of the process Mp is, by assumption, a low en-
tropy state. Thermodynamic-like behaviour is characterised as follows (Lavis
2005): the general tendency is that the entropy of a system that is initially
in a low-entropy state increases until it comes close to its maximum value
and then stays there, but frequent small and very rare large downward fluc-
tuations (contra irreversibility) are allowed. Now proponents of the typi-
cality approach argue that typical initial states show thermodynamic-like
behaviour, and hence that an explanation of thermodynamic-like behaviour
can be given in terms of typicality.7
3 Measure-Theoretic Dynamical Systems
Unlike statistical mechanics, measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory is
not concerned with bridging scales of description. Moreover, while statis-
tical mechanics is a physical theory, dynamical systems theory is a set of
mathematical tools with applications in various sciences (among others, in
physics, chemistry, biology, meteorology and climate science). Furthermore,
5For instance, it is often argued that typical initial states show thermodynamic-like
behaviour (a claim about non-equilibrium) or that typical states are in equilibrium (a
claim about equilibrium).
6In practice physicists usually employ Gibbsian SM, and here the standard measures
(microcanonical measures, canonical measures, and grand-canonical measures) are very
successful in deriving predictions about macroscopic behaviour. The relationship between
Boltzmannian and Gibbsian SM is a controversial theme, which goes beyond the scope of
this paper (for more see Frigg 2008 and Uffink 2007).
7For a list of proponents of the typicality approach, see the references given in the
introduction.
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understanding the behaviour of “most” initial conditions was always a cen-
tral concern in dynamical systems theory. Hence the notion of typicality does
not cause as much controversy here as in statistical mechanics.
Dynamical systems theory can be split into measure-theoretic dynamical sys-
tems theory (where there is a measure and statistical properties are stud-
ied) and topological dynamical systems theory (where there is no measure
and topological properties are studied).8 This paper is only concerned with
measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory. There are also interesting foun-
dational questions in topological dynamical systems theory, where a topolog-
ical notion of typicality plays a role, but this topic is beyond the scope of this
paper (see, e.g., Frigg and Werndl, 2012, for some thoughts on topological
typicality).
Formally, measure-theoretic dynamical systems (mt-dynamical systems) are
defined as follows (Petersen 1983). (X,ΣX , µX , ft) is a mt-dynamical system
iff (if and only if) X is a set (the phase space), where in this paper X is an
interval9 in Rn; ΣX is the Lebesgue σ-algebra of subsets of X (elements of
ΣX are called measurable sets); µX : ΣX → [0, 1] is a normalized measure
on X; and ft : X → X (the evolution equations, ft(x) denotes the state
of the system that started in initial state x after t time steps), where t ∈
R+0 (continuous time) or t ∈ N0 (discrete time), are surjective measurable
mappings such that ft+s = ft(fs) for all t, s ∈ R+0 or N0, ft(x) is jointly
measurable in (x, t), and the measure is invariant under the dynamics, i.e.,
µX(A) = µX(f
−1
t (A)) for all measurable A ⊆ X and all t ∈ R+0 or N0. (1)
Statistical mechanical systems (ΓE,ΣΓE , µE, φt) are (continuous-time) mt-
dynamical systems (where ΣΓE is the Lebesgue σ-algebra of ΓE). This
just means that the (ΓE,ΣΓE , µE, φt) satisfy the formal definition of a mt-
dynamical system. It does not imply that SM is reducible to dynamical
systems theory in any sense (the physical postulates of SM are not part of
8Dynamical systems have been studied from both the measure-theoretic and the topo-
logical perspective, and the interrelations between these perspectives can be very complex
(cf. Petersen 1983).
9An interval in Rn is any set A1 × . . .×An with Ai = (ai, bi) (ai, bi ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}),
(ai, bi] (ai ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}, bi ∈ R), [ai, bi) (ai ∈ R, bi ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}), or [ai, bi]
(ai, bi ∈ R), where always ai < bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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the mathematical framework of dynamical systems theory).
Let me introduce two (discrete-time) mt-dynamical systems which will serves
as examples. They are very simple and hence particularly suited for illustra-
tion purposes.
Example 1. The first example is the tent map (Y,ΣY , µY , st) where Y = [0, 1]
is the unit interval, st(x) = s
t(x) (i.e., the t-th iterate10 of s(x)), t ∈ N0, with
s(x) =
{
2x if 0 ≤ x < 1
2
,
2(1− x) if 1
2
≤ x ≤ 1, (2)
and µY is the uniform measure (Lebesgue measure). Figure 1(a) shows the
density of the measure µY of the tent map.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Example 2. The second example is the logistic map (Z,ΣZ , µZ , rt) where
Z = [0, 1], rt(x) = r
t(x), t ∈ N0, with
r(x) = 4x(1− x), (3)
and the standard measure is given by
µZ(A) =
∫
A
1
pi
√
x(1− x)dλ, (4)
where λ is the Lebesgue measure. Figure 1(b) shows the density of the mea-
sure µZ of the logistic map. The measure of the logistic map is particularly
interesting because, unlike that of the tent map, it is not uniform.
The definition of mt-dynamical systems immediately implies that all dynam-
ical systems are forward deterministic: the state of the system at one time
determines the state of the system at all future times. If, additionally, the
state of the system at one time determines the state of the system at all
past times, then the system is deterministic (i.e., forward and backward de-
terministic). Some mt-dynamical systems such as Example 1 (the tent map)
or Example 2 (the logistic map) are only forward deterministic. Other mt-
dynamical systems such as those in SM are deterministic.
10The 0-th iterate is the identity function, i.e., s0(x) = x for all x ∈ X.
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4 Typicality
A typicality measure represents the relative size of sets of states. Intuitively
speaking, any function µT describing the size of sets of states should satisfy
the standard axioms of a measure: µT (∅) = 0, µT (A) ≥ 0 for any measurable
set A, µT (A ∪ B) = µT (A) + µT (B) whenever A ∩ B = ∅ where A,B are
measurable sets, and µT (∪∞i=1Ai) =
∑∞
i=1 µT (Ai) whenever Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for
all i, j, i 6= j, where all Ai are measurable sets. One might also argue that,
because typicality measures represent the relative size of sets of states, they
should be normalized, i.e., µT (C) = 1, where C is the set of all elements.
Normalized measures are called probability measures. In what follows, I as-
sume that typicality measures are normalized. However, this assumption is
irrelevant for the main result in this paper (Theorems 1 and 2), where there
is exactly the same conclusion if the measures are not normalized.11 The
only results which depend on the assumption that typicality measures are
normalized are the uniqueness results (Theorem 3 and 4), which invoke the
notion of ergodicity and epsilon-ergodicity.
Intuitively speaking, something is typical if it happens in the vast majority
of cases. For instance, typically, when throwing dice, at some point the num-
ber six will show up; or typical lottery tickets are blanks. Formally, given
a basic set of elements C, one says that typical elements have property P
relative to a typicality measure µT iff µT (C \D) = 0, where D ⊆ C consists
of those elements in C that have property P (this will be called typicality I ).
Derivatively, D is called the typical set and C \ D the atypical set. A less
stringent notion of typicality arises when one only requires that the relative
size of atypical sets is close to zero (and not zero). Formally, given a basic set
of elements C, one then says that typical elements have property P relative
to a typicality measure µT iff µT (C \D) ≤ β, where D ⊆ C consists of those
elements in C that have property P and β is a very small real number (this
will be called typicality II ). Then, again, D is called the typical set and C \D
the atypical set.
For example, in SM it is claimed that µE is the typicality measure and
that typical initial states show thermodynamic-like behaviour. That is,
11It is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 1 and 2 also goes through when the measures
are not normalized.
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C = ΓE, µT = µE, P is the property of showing thermodynamic-like be-
haviour and D is the set of initial states showing thermodynamic-like be-
haviour. Measures of mt-dynamical systems, such as the uniform measure
µY of Example 1 of the tent map (see Figure 1(a)) and the measure µZ of
Example 2 of the logistic map (see Figure 1(b)), are also candidates for typ-
icality measures.
Part and parcel of the notion of typicality measures is that states cannot be-
come more or less when they are evolved under the dynamics of the system.
Formally, this means that they should be invariant under the dynamics: the
typicality measure of a set has to equal (i.e., cannot be greater or smaller
than) the typicality measure of the evolved set. Formally, for evolution equa-
tions such as those in SM, which are invertible (and hence forward and back-
ward deterministic), this amounts to the requirement that the size of a set
of states A should be the same as the size of the image or pre-image of A:
µT (A)=µT (ft(A))=µT (f
−1
t (A)) for all t∈R+0 or t ∈N0 for all measurable A.
(5)
For evolution equations such as those of Example 1 (the tent map) or Ex-
ample 2 (the logistic map), which are not invertible (hence only forward
deterministic), the requirement is that the size of a set of states A should be
the same as the size of the pre-image of A:
µT (A) = µT (f
−1
t (A)) for all t ∈ R+0 or t ∈ N0 for all measurable A. (6)
Proponents of the typicality approach also require this (e.g., Goldstein 2001,
15; Lebowitz 1993b, 8).12
When discussing the invariance condition, it is important to mention Liou-
ville’s equation, which is a central equation in SM that describes the time-
evolution of a probability density ρ(x) = ρ(p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn) in phase
space:
∂ρ
∂t
= −
n∑
i=1
∂ρ
∂qi
q˙i +
∂ρ
∂pi
p˙i, (7)
12This invariance condition is so important in measure-theoretic dynamical systems
theory that for a mt-dynamical system it is required that the measure is invariant (see
equation (1)).
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where the time-derivatives are denoted by dots. The notion of absolute con-
tinuity will be important in what follows. Formally, for measures µ1 and µ2
defined on (X,ΣX), µ2 is absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ1 (µ2  µ1) iff
if µ1(A) = 0 for a measurable set A, then µ2(A) = 0. (8)
The stationary solutions of the Liouville equation (i.e., when ∂ρ/∂t = 0) give
the probability densities which do not change in time and hence the invariant
measures absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.13 Finding the
stationary solutions of the Liouville equation for systems in SM is extremely
hard. In general, one does not know the class of all its stationary solutions.
In Section 7 where a justification of typicality measures for typicality I is
proposed, it is argued that typicality measures are invariant and absolutely
continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.14 Therefore, the stationary solutions
of the Liouville equation are of interest because they are potential candidates
for typicality measures.
The next section will outline Pitowsky’s (2012) argument, which is the only
justification of typicality measures of SM and measure-theoretic dynamical
systems known to the author.
5 Pitowsky’s Justification of Typicality Mea-
sures
Pitowsky’s argument goes as follows. Consider {0, 1}n – the set of all se-
quences of length n consisting of zeros and ones (n ∈ N). When the phase
space consists of a finite number of N elements (N ∈ N), Pitowsky claims
that the typicality measure is easy to find: just count the number of el-
ements of a set and divide it by N . Hence, for an arbitrary subset A of
{0, 1}n, the typicality measure is µn(A) = |A|/2n, where |A| is the number of
elements of A. Pitowsky states that the real difficulty lies in the question of
how to determine typicality measures for phase spaces with an infinite num-
ber of elements (as in SM and measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory).
Pitowsky does not provide any arguments why the uniform measure is the
13According to the Radon-Nikodym theorem, a measure is absolutely continuous w.r.t.
the Lebesgue measure iff there is a probability density (Nielsen, 1997).
14The latter claim follows from Premises 2 and 3.
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correct typicality measure for phase spaces with a finite number of elements.
It is important to point out that this claim can be questioned. I will argue
that even if this claim is accepted, Pitowsky’s argument fails.
To tackle the question how to justify typicality measures for phase spaces
with an infinite number of elements, Pitowsky starts with the special case of
{0, 1}∞ – the set of all infinite sequences of zeros and ones. A unique measure
µ∞ on {0, 1}∞ is obtained by approximating a set B in {0, 1}∞ by sets A in
{0, 1}n, n ∈ N, and then defining the measure of B to be the limit of the
measure of the approximating sets A. The measure µ∞, Pitowsky claims, it
the correct typicality measure on {0, 1}∞.
How to arrive at typicality measures on phase spaces of SM and measure-
theoretic dynamical systems theory, which are usually quite different from
{0, 1}∞? Pitowsky (2012) concentrates on the case where the phase space is
the unit interval [0, 1]. He claims that all other cases can be reduced to this
case because any relevant15 phase space with a measure on it is isomorphic
to the measure space of the unit interval [0, 1] with the uniform measure on
it. To spell out my criticism of Pitowsky (2012), only a discussion of this
special case of the unit interval will be needed. Thus, for simplicity, what
follows concentrate on it. (However, I will briefly comment on Pitowsky’s
appeal to the isomorphism result in footnote 19).
To arrive at a typicality measure on [0, 1], Pitowsky first notes that the points
of {0, 1}∞ can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the points of [0, 1]
by assigning to each sequence ω = (ω1, ω2, . . .), ω ∈ {0, 1}∞, the number16
φ(ω) =
∞∑
i=1
ωi/2
i. (9)
φ maps the measure µ∞ on {0, 1}∞ to a measure on [0, 1]. Namely, one
obtains the uniform measure on [0, 1]. Consequently, Pitowsky concludes,
the uniform measure is the uniquely correct typicality measure on [0, 1].
15Technically, the condition is that the measure space is a Lebesgue space (for a definition
see Petersen 1983).
16Strictly speaking, the function only establishes a one-to-one correspondence of
{0, 1}∞ \Q and [0, 1], where Q is the set of all sequences ending with an infinite number
of ones excluding the sequence (1, 1, . . .) consisting only of ones. That Q is excluded is
irrelevant because µ∞(Q) = 0 (cf. Pitowsky 2012).
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6 Criticism of Pitowsky’s Justification
Unfortunately, problems arise with Pitowsky’s justification. First of all,
Pitowsky arrives at a measure on [0, 1] by using φ to map the measure µ∞
on {0, 1}∞ to a measure on [0, 1]. However, other functions than φ which
provide a one-to-one correspondence between the points of {0, 1}∞ and [0, 1]
could be used to map the measure on {0, 1}∞ to a measure on [0, 1]. Indeed,
one can arrive at infinitely many different measures on [0, 1] by relating [0, 1]
to the set of sequences of zeros and ones. For example, suppose that to each
sequence ω = (ω1, ω2, . . .), ω ∈ {0, 1}∞, is assigned the number16
ψ(ω) = sin2(
pi
2
∞∑
i=1
ωi/2
i). (10)
Then, when ψ is used to map the measure µ∞ to a measure on [0, 1], one ob-
tains the invariant measure of the logistic map shown in Figure 1(b) (Aligood
et al. 1996). To sum up, it is unclear which map should be used to arrive
at a typicality measure on [0, 1]. Pitowsky does not address why φ should
be preferred over other maps, and there seems to be no easy answer to the
question which map to prefer. Thus Pitowsky’s argument is wanting.
Second, Pitowsky (2012, 17-18) explicitly states that his argument not only
applies to statistical mechanical systems but more generally to many other
mt-dynamical systems. However, as I will show now, here his argument leads
to undesirable conclusions. According to Pitowsky, his argument applies to
the logistic map (Example 2)17, which is defined on the unit interval. Hence
for the logistic map the uniform measure is the correct typicality measure.
However, the measure which dynamical system theorists’ choose (i.e., the cor-
rect measure according to practice in dynamical systems theory) is different,
namely µZ (as shown in Figure 1(b)). Furthermore, recall that, as argued in
Section 4, typicality measures should be invariant under the dynamic. How-
ever, for the logistic map the uniform measure is not invariant and hence
cannot be a typicality measure. Instead, the standard measure µZ is invari-
ant. (I will argue in Sections 7, 8 and 9 that µZ is the correct typicality
measure).
17Pitowsky (2012) states that his argument applies to two-symbol Bernoulli systems,
and the logistic map is a two-symbol Bernoulli system (cf. footnote 18).
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The general picture is that for some mt-dynamical systems with phase space
[0, 1] the uniform measure is the correct measure according to practice in dy-
namical systems theory and is invariant under the dynamics. The tent map
(Example 1) is a case in point. However, for many other mt-dynamical sys-
tems with phase space [0, 1], such as the logistic map (Example 2), the correct
measure according to practice in dynamical systems theory is not the uniform
measure and the uniform measure is not invariant. Yet Pitowsky’s argument
implies that the uniform measure is always the correct typicality measure.
Hence his argument is flawed. This point suggests that when justifying typi-
cality measures not only the phase space (as in Pitowsky’s justification) but
also the dynamics needs to be taken into consideration: as Example 1 (the
tent map) and Example 2 (the logistic map) illustrate, different dynamics on
[0, 1] will lead to different typicality measures.
Indeed, Pitowsky (2012, 17-18) gives examples of mt-dynamical systems
which highlight these problems. Intuitively speaking, two-symbol Bernoulli
systems are dynamical systems whose solutions can be put into one-to-one
correspondence with the set of all infinite sequences arising from indepen-
dent trials of tossing a coin (i.e., the set {0, 1}∞).18 Because the solutions of
two-symbol Bernoulli systems correspond to the set of all infinite sequences
{0, 1}∞, Pitowsky argues that two-symbol Bernoulli systems and their mea-
sures illustrate the correctness of his justification. However, contrary to
Pitowsky, the measure of many two-symbol Bernoulli systems with phase
space [0, 1] is not the uniform measure. For instance, the logistic map (Ex-
ample 2) is a two-symbol Bernoulli system and its solutions can be put into
one-to-one correspondence with {0, 1}∞ (see equation (10)) (Werndl 2009a).
Yet µZ – the measure of the logistic map – is not uniform. Consequently,
rather than illustrating the correctness of Pitowsky’s argument, two-symbol
Bernoulli systems highlight its problems.19
18Formally, let Ω = {0, 1}∞. That is, Ω is the set of all infinite sequences (ω1, ω2, . . .)
with ωi ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to the possible outcomes of an infinite sequence of in-
dependent trials of a (possibly biased) coin. Let ΣΩ be the set of all subsets of infi-
nite sequences to which probabilities can be assigned, let µΩ be the normalized mea-
sure on Ω arising from the probability measure of tossing the coin, and let S : Ω → Ω,
S((ω1, ω2, . . .)) = (ω2, ω3, . . .). (Ω,ΣΩ, µΩ, S) is called a two-symbol Bernoulli shift. Fi-
nally, two-symbol Bernoulli systems are defined to be mt-dynamical systems which are iso-
morphic (from a measure-theoretic perspective) to two-symbol Bernoulli shifts (cf. Werndl
2009a).
19As mentioned above, Pitowsky (2012) claims that cases where the phase space is not
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To conclude, Pitowsky’s justification of typicality measures does not fit the
bill. The next two sections aim to provide a first tentative proposal of how to
justify typicality measures in SM and measure-theoretic dynamical systems
theory. Section 7 presents the argument for typicality I and Section 8 the
argument for typicality II (see Section 4 for a definition of typicality I and
typicality II). The guiding idea is that typicality measures are invariant and
are related to the initial probability distributions of interest (in particular,
typicality measures should serve as a shortcut to make claims about any
initial probability distribution of interest).
7 A New Proposal: Typicality I
First of all, as argued in Section 4, typicality measures are invariant:
Premise 1: Typicality measures are invariant under the dynamics.
It is important to note that the requirement of invariance alone cannot justify
typicality measures. To stress the point, consider the phase space W = [0, 1]
with the evolution equation ft(w) = w for all t ∈ N0. Clearly, for this phase
space and evolution equation all measures fulfill equation (5). Thus they
are all invariant under the dynamics, but they do not agree on which sets
are typical/atypical. Hence the condition of invariance alone cannot justify
typicality measures.
An initial probability distribution gives the probability that a system is pre-
[0, 1] can be reduced to the case where the phase space is [0, 1] because any relevant phase
space with a measure on it (technically: any Lebesgue space) is isomorphic to the measure
space of [0, 1] with the uniform measure on it. I do not think that Pitowskys’ appeal to
this isomorphism result is successful. Pitowsky’s concern is to find, given a phase space S
such as ΓE , the correct typicality measure. But then this isomorphism result is of no help
because it presupposes that there is already a measure defined on S. If just the phase space
S is given (this is the problem of concern), then there are usually infinitely many ways
of mapping S to the unit interval. Consequently, even if one assumes that the correct
typicality measure on [0, 1] is the uniform measure, there are infinitely many different
possible measures on S arising from mapping the uniform measure on [0, 1] to S (and
hence infinitely many different possible measures on S such that the resulting measure
space is isomorphic to [0, 1] with the uniform measure on it.) Hence there is no hope that
the isomorphism result can justify that a certain measure such as µE on ΓE is the correct
typicality measure.
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pared in a certain microstate (e.g., that an experimenter prepares a gas in
a certain microstate). This paper will assume that these initial probability
distributions p are translation-continuous, i.e., that
lim
||τ ||→0
p(Tr(A, τ)) = p(A) for all open sets A, (11)
where ||τ || is the standard Euclidean norm in Rn (i.e., the standard Euclidean
metric between the vector τ and the zero-vector in Rn) and Tr(A, τ) is the
set A translated by τ , i.e.,
Tr(A, τ) = X ∩ {x+ τ | x ∈ A}. (12)
Malament and Zabell (1980) have provided a nice motivation of this condi-
tion: they have argued that when one prepares a system in SM, one does
not have sufficient accuracy to create any other probability measure than a
translation-continuous probability measure.20 Malament and Zabell (1980)
have also shown that a probability measure p is translation-continuous iff
p  λ, i.e., p is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure λ (see
equation (8)).21 That p λ seems to be often endorsed in the physics com-
munity (cf. Leeds 1989; Maudlin 2007).
Now, different initial probability distributions might arise in SM: Systems
can be prepared in different macrostates, different scientists might prepare
systems differently. Thus there is a class P of initial probability distributions
of interest. Open sets are extended regions of phase space. This motivates
the only additional requirement on this class, namely that for any arbitrary
20Leeds (1989) has reconstructed Malament and Zabell’s argument for translation-
continuity as the claim that the microstate of a system in SM is a continuous function of
the parameters of the preparation of the system. As van Lith (2001) and Vranas (1998)
have pointed out, this claim is problematic: clearly, the microstate of a system not only
depends on the parameters of preparation but also on the microstate prior to preparation.
Hence similar values of the preparation parameters may well lead to quite different mi-
crostates. However, Malament and Zabell seemed to have the different claim in mind that
we do not have sufficient accuracy to create probability measures that are not translation-
continuous.
21They proved this result only for the phase space Rn. Yet it is clear that it also holds
for any arbitrary interval of Rn. Although the phase space of systems in SM are not
intervals, Malament and Zabell (1980) and Vranas (1998) believe that the equivalence of
translation-continuity and absolute continuity also holds for the phase spaces in SM, and
I follow them in assuming this.
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open region of phase space one cannot exclude that there might be some way
of preparing the system such that there is a positive probability that one
ends up in this region. So:
Premise 2. The initial probability distributions of interest are a
class P of translation-close probability distributions where for ev-
ery open set A there is a p ∈ P with p(A) > 0.
Davey (2008), Hemmo and Shenker (2012) and Leeds (1989) have criticised
the extant foundational literature on Boltzmannian SM for assuming that
the initial probability distribution is µE and has to be invariant under the
dynamics. They rightly argue that the initial probability distribution can be
different from µE and may well not be invariant under the dynamics. For in-
stance, Hemmo and Shenker (2012, 11) complain: “In particular the measure
need not be the Lebesgue measure, and may not even be conserved under
the dynamics”.22 So the great flexibility on the initial probability distribution
in SM allowed by Premise 2 should be welcome.
Concerning dynamical systems theory, note that in certain applications ini-
tial probability distributions over the states play a role. The justification of
typicality measures advanced here will be relevant whenever Premise 2 holds.
For instance, consider the dynamical system of a frictionless pendulum, con-
sisting of a mass m that experiences a single force F which depends only
on the position of the mass and a constant (this is the harmonic oscillator).
Suppose that one does not have sufficient accuracy to create any other initial
probability distribution than a translation-continuous one (which has some
plausibility). Further, since in experiments one has the freedom to prepare
the system in all kinds of different initial positions and initial velocities, it
seems reasonable that for any arbitrary open region of phase space there is a
probability distribution of interest which assigns positive probability to this
region. Then the uniform measure of the pendulum can be justified as typi-
cality measure.
The next two premises are motivated by the idea that typicality measures
22Note that this remark about the initial probability distribution could not also be
made about the typicality measure. The typicality measure is not the initial probability
distribution over the states in an experiment. The typicality measure counts states and,
as argued, it is part and parcel of a measure that counts states that it is invariant (because
states cannot become more or less when they are evolved under the dynamics).
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should be related to the initial probability distributions of interest. More
specifically, first, it seems reasonable to require that if a set of states has
probability zero for all initial probabilities of interest, the set is atypical:
Premise 3. If p(A)=0 for all probability distributions of interest
for some measurable A, then T(A)=0.
(Equivalent formulation: If p(A) = 1 for all probability distributions of in-
terest for some measurable A, then T (A) = 1).
Second, the typicality measure should serve as a shortcut to make claims
about the likely behaviour of the system for any possible initial probability
distribution. That is, it will be required that whenever a set of states is typ-
ical, it has probability one for all initial probability distributions of interest:
Premise 4. If T (A) = 1 for some measurable A, then p(A) = 1 for all
probability distributions of interest.
(Equivalent formulation: If T (A) = 0 for some measurable A, then p(A) = 0
for all probability distributions of interest).
Also, the following premise is adopted:
Premise 5. Whenever a measure fulfills Premises 1, 3 and 4 (for
the probability distributions as characterised by Premise 2), then
it is a typicality measure.
It will be shown23 that measures satisfying Premises 1, 3 and 4 agree on
which sets are typical or there is a unique measure satisfying these premises.
Hence it seems reasonable to take these conditions as sufficient for typicality
measures.
Finally, let me specify the systems under consideration:
Premise 6. Let a statistical mechanical system (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE) be
given, or let a dynamical system (X,ΣX , φt, µX) be given where X is
an interval in Rn, µX  λ and λ µX.
For many standardly used measures µX in measure-theoretic dynamical sys-
tems theory µX  λ and λ µX . For instance, it is clear that this condition
holds for the measure µY of the tent map (Example 1) and the measure µZ
23This is shown when proving Theorem 1 (see Appendix 1).
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of the logistic map (Example 2).
The following result is derivable from these premises (for the proof see Ap-
pendix 1):
Conclusion (Theorem 1). The measure µE of systems in statisti-
cal mechanics/the measure µX of dynamical systems is a typicality
measure. Furthermore, any other typicality measure will agree
with µE/µX on which sets are typical.
This result aims to justify typicality measures µE in SM and typicality mea-
sures µX of dynamical systems such as the tent map (Example 1) or the
logistic map (Example 2). µE and µX are typicality measures. They may
not be the unique typicality measures, but this does not matter because any
other typicality measure agrees on which sets are typical. Note that in my
argument typicality is different from probability: the typicality measures do
not refer to probabilities in the philosophical sense (they do not refer to, e.g.,
ontic probabilities describing the distributions which arise in experiments or
to degrees of belief).24
Let me now present a cost-benefit analysis of the argument. As outlined
when introducing Premise 2, it can be motivated that the initial probabil-
ity distributions in SM are translation-continuous. Also, it seems plausible
that for any arbitrary open region of phase space one cannot exclude that
it might be possible to prepare the system in such a way that there is a
positive probability of ending up in this region. Still, these two requirements
are not incontestable because the knowledge about these initial probability
distributions is limited. Premise 5 (that measures fulfilling Premises 1, 3
and 4 are typicality measures) seems reasonable because all such typicality
measures agree on which sets are typical. Still, some might think that these
premises are only necessary and not sufficient for typicality measures. Thus
24Typicality measures are what are formally called “probability measures” (see Section 4
for a formal definition). However, just because they are formally probability measures,
this does not mean that they refer to probabilities in the philosophical sense. To give an
example: the Lebesgue measure on [0,1] is formally a probability measure, but it is often
interpreted as “length”, which is not probabilistic in the philosophical sense. Similarly,
typicality measures which count states do not refer to probabilities. When one says, e.g.,
that 999/1000 of the balls are red, this statement does not refer to probabilities in the
philosophical sense.
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they might want to add further requirements (in this case my argument is
still relevant: it shows that any typicality measure fulfilling these additional
requirements will agree with µE/µX about judgement of typicality).
Concerning the benefits, first, there is a conceptual gain from knowing that
the choice of the standard typicality measures can be motivated from Premises
1-6. Second, there is an empirical gain because the typicality measures are
related to the initial probability distributions of interest (Premises 3 and 4).
In particular, claims about typical behaviour translate into claims about the
likely behaviour of the system for any initial probability distribution of in-
terest. Without such a connection, inevitably the question would arise how
typicality measures are connected to experiments. Third, according to my
argument, a wide range of initial probability distributions are allowed (see
Premise 2). This is a strength because, as argued above, different probability
distributions may arise in different contexts, and my argument is consistent
with this (this is another empirical gain). Particularly the empirical gains
might make the argument also attractive for physicists.
8 A New Proposal: Typicality II
Let me now outline the analogous argument for the less stringent notion of
typicality II. The first premise remains the same:
Premise 1∗. Typicality measures are invariant under the dynamics.
Recall that the preparation of a system in SM is described by an initial proba-
bility distribution. Here we assume that these initial probability distributions
p are δ ∗ κ-translation-close, i.e., that for all open sets A in X:
||τ || < δ → |p(Tr(A, τ))− p(A)| < κ, (13)
where δ > 0 and 0 < κ < 1 are very small real numbers. The condition
of translation-closeness can be motivated in a similar fashion as translation-
continuity. That is, when one prepares a system in SM, one does not have
sufficient accuracy to create any other probability measure than a translation-
close probability measure.25 Vranas (1998) has shown a result analogous to
25Vranas (1998) advances another argument for translation-closeness. According to
Vranas, measurements correspond to coarse-graining the phase space into finitely many
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Malament and Zabell’s equivalence of the conditions of absolute continuity
and translation-closeness. To state it, I first need to introduce a definition.
The measure ν is ε1/ε2-continuous w.r.t. the measure µ (where ν and µ are
both defined on (X,ΣX)) (νε2µε1) iff:
if µ(A) ≤ ε1 for a measurable set A, then ν(A) ≤ ε2. (14)
The result shown by Vranas is that if p is δ ∗ κ-translation-close, p is ε1/ε2-
continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure for κ < ε2 < 1 and ε1 < (ε2 − κ)δn,
where δn is the volume of the n-sphere with radius δ.
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As before, different initial probability distributions might arise in SM, and
thus there is a class P of initial probability distributions of interest. Open
sets (and especially open sets whose Lebesgue measure is not very small) are
extended regions of phase space. This motivates the only additional require-
ment on this class, namely that for an open region which is not very small,
one cannot exclude that there might be some way of preparing the system
sets (called phase cells) whose states lead to the same measured value. The idea is that
in practice all that matters are coarse-grained probability measures (where a measure is
assigned only to unions of phase cells) and all that is needed is an argument that any
coarse-grained probability measure is translation-close. Vranas’s approach does not work
because there are irresolvable technical difficulties. When the phase space is coarse-grained,
then ft(A), where A is a phase cell and t ∈ R+ or N, will often not be a phase cell again
(cf. Werndl 2009a). However, the definition of mt-dynamical systems requires that ft(A) is
an element of the phase space for all phase cells A and all t (because otherwise the fts are
not functions from the phase space to the phase space). Also, because ft(A) and f
−1
t (A)
may not be phase cells again, the conditions of invariance (equations (5) and (6)) cease to
be applicable. Furthermore, Tr(A, τ) will usually not be an element of the coarse-grained
phase space, implying that the notion of translation-continuity ceases to be applicable.
Problems arise even if these technical difficulties are set aside: Vranas claims that as the
measurement precision increases, the maximum measure of the size of a phase cell will
become smaller. From this he concludes that sufficiently small displacements of sets only
lead to a very small change of the coarse-grained measure (implying translation-closeness).
However, as van Lith (2001) has pointed out, this conclusion is unwarranted because the
decreasing cell size is accompanied by a compensating increase of the number of cells that
are added or deleted because of the displacement (hence it is unclear whether the total
size of the added or deleted phase cells will become smaller).
26Vranas proved this result only for the phase space Rn, but it is clear from the proof
that it also holds for any arbitrary interval of Rn. Although the phase spaces in SM are
not intervals, I follow Malament and Zabell (1980) and Vranas (1998) in assuming that
this result also holds for systems in SM.
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such that the probability of ending up in this region is not very small. For-
mally, if λ(A) > Ψ for an open set A for a very small Ψ > 0, then P includes
an initial probability distribution p with p(A) > Ψ. This condition will be
required to hold for Ψ = ε2 and Ψ = ε3. So:
Premise 2∗. The initial probability distribution of interest are
a class P of translation-close probability distributions where if
λ(A) > Ψ for an open set A, then there is a p ∈ P with p(A) > Ψ
(where Ψ = ε2 or ε3).
Note that this great flexibility on the initial probability distribution in SM
allowed by Premise 2∗ should be welcome.
Concerning dynamical systems theory, also in certain applications initial
probability distributions over the states play a role. The justification of
typicality measures advanced here is relevant whenever Premise 2∗ holds.
For instance, consider again the dynamical system of a frictionless pendu-
lum, consisting of a mass m that experiences a single force F which depends
only on the position of the mass and a constant. Suppose that one does not
have sufficient accuracy to create any other initial probability distribution
than a translation-close one (which has some plausibility). Further, since in
experiments one has the freedom to prepare the system in all kinds of differ-
ent initial positions and initial velocities, it seems plausible that for an open
region of phase space that is not very small, there is an initial probability
distribution which assigns a non-negligible probability to this region. Then
the uniform measure can be justified as typicality measure.
The next two premises relate typicality to the initial probability distributions
of interest. First, it seems reasonable to require that if a set of states has
very small probability for all initial probabilities of interest, then the set is
atypical:
Premise 3∗. If p(A) ≤ ε2 for all probability distributions of inter-
est for some measurable A, then T (A) ≤ β (for very small ε2, β;
0 ≤ ε2, β).
Second, because the typicality measure should serve as a shortcut, it is re-
quired that if a set of states is typical, it is of very high probability for all
initial probability distributions of interest:
Premise 4∗. If T (A) > 1−β for some measurable A, then p(A) > 1−ε3
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for all probability distributions of interest (for very small ε3, β;
0 ≤ β < ε3).
As before, the following assumption is made:
Premise 5∗. Whenever a measure fulfills Premises 1∗, 3∗ and 4∗ (for
the probability distributions as characterized by Premise 2∗), it is
a typicality measure.
It will later be shown that measures satisfying Premises 1∗, 3∗ and 4∗ can be
interchangeably used as typicality measures.27 Hence it seems reasonable to
take these conditions as sufficient for typicality measures.
Let me specify the systems under consideration:
Premise 6∗. Let a statistical mechanical system (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE) be
given, or let a dynamical system (X,ΣX , φt, µX) be given where X
is an interval in Rn, µXβ λε2 and λε4 µXβ, (ε2 < β; β < ε4; ε4 ≤
ε3 + ε1 − ε2).
For many of the standard measures µX in measure-theoretic dynamical sys-
tems theory µXβλε2 and λε4µXβ for very small ε2, β and ε4. For instance,
this trivially holds for the measure µY of the tent map (Example 1), and it is
easy to see that it holds for the measure µZ of the logistic map (Example 2).
28
Finally, I also adopt the following premise:
Premise 7∗. Assume that νβ2µβ1 and µβ4 νβ3 (for very small βi,
0 < βi; 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) and that µ and ν both satisfy Premises 1∗, 3∗ and
4∗. Then, pragmatically speaking, µ and ν can be interchangeably
used as typicality measures.
This can be motivated as follows. The antecedent of Premise 7∗ implies that
claims about typicality in terms of µ are translatable into claims about typ-
icality in terms of ν, and vice versa: If a set D is typical with respect to µ,
27This is shown when proving Theorem 2 (see Appendix 2).
28Let µX(A) ≤ β for an arbitrary β. Then β ≥ µX(A) ≥
∫
A
ω−1dλ = ω−1λ(A), where
ω−1 = minx 1
pi
√
x(1−x) . Hence λωβ µXβ . Conversely, let λ(A) ≤ β for an arbitrary β.
Then µX(A) ≤
∫
ρdλ ≤ ρλ(A) ≤ ρβ, where ρ = ∫ β/2
0
1
pi
√
x(1−x)dλ +
∫ 1
1−β/2
1
pi
√
x(1−x)dλ.
Thus µXρβλβ .
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i.e. µ(D) > 1− β1, D is typical w.r.t. ν because ν(D) > 1− β2. Conversely,
if a set D is typical with respect to ν, i.e. ν(D) > 1−β3, D is typical w.r.t. µ
because µ(D) > 1−β4. That such measures can, pragmatically speaking, be
both used as typicality measures seems to be often endorsed by proponents
of the typicality approach, e.g., Goldstein (2001) or Maudlin (2007).
The following result is derivable from these premises:
Conclusion (Theorem 2). The measure µE of systems in statisti-
cal mechanics/the measure µX of dynamical systems is a typicality
measure. Furthermore, for any other typicality measure T , prag-
matically speaking, µE and T/µX and T can be interchangeably
used as typicality measures.
This result aims to justify typicality measures µE in SM and typicality mea-
sures µX of dynamical systems such as the tent map (Example 1) or the
logistic map (Example 2). µE and µX are typicality measures. They may
not be the unique typicality measures, but this does not matter because any
other typicality measure can be interchangeably used as typicality measure.
Note that, again, the typicality measures do not refer to probabilities in the
philosophical sense.
The cost-benefit analysis is similar as for typicality I. Concerning Premise 2∗,
it seems plausible that the initial probability distributions are translation-
close and that for an open region which is not very small, one cannot exclude
that there might be some way of preparing the system such that the probabil-
ity of ending up in this region is not very small. Still, these two requirements
are not incontestable because the knowledge about these initial probability
distributions is limited. Premise 5∗ seems reasonable because it follows that
all such typicality measures can, pragmatically speaking, be interchangeably
used as typicality measures. Still, some might want to add further require-
ments for something to count as typicality measure (then my argument is still
relevant: it shows that measures fulfilling these additional requirements can,
pragmatically speaking, be interchangeably used with µE/µX as typicality
measures). The motivation of Premise 7∗ is that claims about typicality in
terms of µ are translatable into claims about typicality in terms of ν, and
vice versa. Still, µ and ν can disagree on the size assigned to sets, and some
might not want to allow this.
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Regarding the benefits, first, there is a conceptual gain from knowing that
the choice of the standard typicality measures follows from Premises 1∗-7∗.
Second, there is an empirical gain because the typicality measures are related
to the initial probability distributions of interest (Premises 3∗ and 4∗). Third,
it is a strength that a wide range of probability distributions are allowed (see
Premise 2∗), and this is another empirical gain. These empirical gains might
make the argument attractive for physicists.
9 Uniqueness Results
In this section I show that if a further assumption is added to the argu-
ment, then the typicality measure is unique (typicality I)/unique from a
pragmatic perspective (typicality II). This further assumption is the dynam-
ical condition of ergodicity (typicality I)/epsilon-ergodicity (typicality II).
A mt-dynamical system (X,ΣX , µX , ft) is ergodic iff there is no measur-
able set A in X, 0 < µX(A) < 1, such that ft(A) = A for all t ∈ R+
or N. A mt-dynamical system (X,ΣX , µX , ft) is epsilon-ergodic iff it is er-
godic on a set of measure 1 − ε0, for a very small ε0 ≥ 0.29 Formally:
(X,ΣX , µX , ft) is ε0-ergodic, where 0 ≤ ε0 < 1 is a real number, iff there is
a measurable set V ⊂ X, µ(V ) = 1 − ε0, with ft(V ) ⊆ V for all t ∈ R+
or N such that the mt-dynamical system (V,ΣV , µV , fVt ) is ergodic where
ΣV = {V ∩ A;A ∈ ΣX}, µV (·) = µX(·)/µX(V ) for any set in V , and fVt is
ft restricted to V . (X,ΣX , µX , ft) is epsilon-ergodic iff it is ε0-ergodic for a
very small ε0 ≥ 0.
To state the uniqueness results, one more definition is needed. The measures
µX and T both defined on (X,ΣX) are θ-close, where 0 < θ < 1 is a very
small real number, iff:
|µX(A)− T (A)| < θ for all measurable sets A in X. (15)
Note that for θ-close measures µ and ν, νβ1+θ  µβ1 and µβ3+θ  νβ3 for
any β1, β3 ≥ 0. Hence, pragmatically speaking, they can be interchangeably
used as typicality measures (cf. Premise 7∗). Assuming that one does not
care about differences of typicality measures of size θ, θ-close measures are
29Here it is always assumed that ε0 is negligible compared to the measure of any of the
macroregions, i.e., that ε0/mini(µE(ΓMi)) = Θ, for a very small Θ ≥ 0.
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identical from a pragmatic perspective.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Premises 1-6 hold and that the sta-
tistical mechanical system (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE)/the dynamical system
(X,ΣX , φt, µX) is ergodic. Then µE/µX is the unique typicality mea-
sure.
For a proof of Theorem 3, see Appendix 3.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Premises 1∗-7∗ hold and that the sta-
tistical mechanical system (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE)/the dynamical system
(X,ΣX , φt, µX) is β-ergodic. Then any other typicality measure T
is ε6-close to µE/µX, where ε6 = 2(β + ε4 − ε1) + β/(1− β).
For a proof of Theorem 4, see Appendix 4. There are many dynamical sys-
tems, including the tent map (Example 1) and the logistic map (Example
2) and generally all chaotic systems, which are ergodic/epsilon-ergodic (cf.
Aligood, Sauer and Yorke 1996; Werndl 2009b). Hence for these systems
Theorem 3/Theorem 4 shows that the typicality measure is unique/unique
from a pragmatic perspective.
In SM ergodicity and epsilon-ergodicity have a long and notorious history.
Boltzmann already invoked the notion of ergodicity in some of his arguments
(Uffink 2007). In the contemporary literature on the foundations of SM sev-
eral papers have defended the claim, or have assumed in their arguments,
that systems in SM are ergodic or epsilon-ergodic (e.g., Frigg and Werndl
2012; Malament and Zabell 1980; Pitowsky 2012; Vranas 1998). One of the
most important mathematical results so far about ergodicity is the proof of
the Boltzmann-Sinai hypothesis – that the motion of n hard-spheres on the
two or three-dimensional torus is ergodic (Sima´nyi 2010). The relevant math-
ematics is so difficult that for more realistic systems than hard spheres the
knowledge is limited and largely based on numerical simulations. Because of
this, some argue that one simply does not know yet whether more realistic
systems in SM are ergodic or epsilon-ergodic (cf. Uffink 2007). In this pa-
per no commitment to ergodicity or epsilon-ergodicity is needed. Here it is
just important that for systems such as hard spheres Theorem 3/Theorem 4
demonstrates that the typicality measure is unique/unique from a pragmatic
perspective. Moreover, if some more realistic systems in SM turn out to be
ergodic/epsilon-ergodic (which is certainly possible), Theorem 3/Theorem 4
shows that the typicality measure is unique/unique from a pragmatic per-
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spective.
As a side remark, it should be noted that some have argued that the condition
of ergodicity or epsilon-ergodicity guarantees thermodynamic-like behaviour
(cf. Frigg and Werndl 2011). First, consider ergodicity, which is equivalent
to the condition that the portion of time an arbitrary solution stays in A
equals the measure of A. Formally: LA(x) = µE(A) for all initial conditions
x ∈ ΓE except, perhaps, a set B with µE(B) = 0, where
LA(x) = lim
t→∞
∫
A
χA(φτ (x))dτ (16)
(here χA(x) is the characteristic function
30 of A). Consider an initial con-
dition x ∈ ΓE \ B. Then the dynamics will carry x to Meq and will keep
it there most of the time. The system will move out of the equilibrium re-
gion every now and then and visit non-equilibrium regions. Yet since these
regions are small compared to the equilibrium region, it will only spend a
small fraction of time there. Therefore, the entropy is close to its maximum
most of the time and fluctuates away from it only occasionally. Hence if µE is
interpreted as probability/typicality measure, thermodynamic-like behaviour
is of probability 1/typical (typicality I). Concerning ε-ergodic systems, note
that such a system is ergodic on V . Consequently, it shows thermodynamic-
like behaviour for the initial conditions in V . Then, by the same moves as
explained above for ergodicity, one finds that thermodynamic-like behaviour
is of probability 1− ε/typical (typicality II).
10 Conclusion
A popular view in contemporary Boltzmannian statistical mechanics is to
interpret the measures as typicality measures, i.e. as representing the rela-
tive size of sets of states. In measure-theoretic dynamical systems theory
measures can similarly be interpreted as typicality measures. However, a
justification why these measures are a good choice of typicality measures is
missing, and the paper attempted to contribute to fill this gap.
The paper first criticised Pitowsky (2012) – the only justification of typi-
cality measures known to the author. Pitowsky’s argument goes as follows.
30That is, χA(x) = 1 for x ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
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Consider the set {0, 1}∞ of all infinite sequences of zeros and ones. By ap-
proximation with the measures defined on the sets {0, 1}n of finite sequences
of zeros and ones, a unique measure µ∞ is obtained on {0, 1}∞. Let φ be the
map which assigns to each infinite sequence ω of zeros and ones the number
in the unit interval whose binary development is ω. When φ is used to map
the measure µ∞ on {0, 1}∞ to a measure on the unit interval, one obtains
the uniform measure. Hence, Pitowsky concludes, the uniform measure is
the uniquely correct typicality measure. This paper argued that Pitowsky’s
argument is problematic. It is unclear why φ and not another function is
used to map the measure µ∞ to the unit interval. Furthermore, there are
counterexamples because for many systems on the unit interval the uniform
measure is not the standard measure used and is not invariant.
The paper then provided a first tentative proposal of how to justify typicality
measures for two notions, namely typicality I (atypical means measure zero)
and typicality II (atypical means very small measure). The main premises of
the argument are as follows. The initial probability distributions of interest
are translation-continuous (for typicality I) or translation-close (for typical-
ity II). A typicality measure should be related to these initial probability
distributions in two ways: First, if a set is of probability zero (for typicality
I) or of very small probability (for typicality II) for all probability distribu-
tions, then it is atypical. Second, if a set is typical, it is of probability one
(for typicality I) or of very high probability (for typicality II) for all prob-
ability distributions. Furthermore, typicality measures should be invariant.
The conclusion are two theorems which show that the standard measures of
statistical mechanics and dynamical systems theory are typicality measures.
There may be other typicality measures, but these agree on which sets are
typical (for typicality I) or can be interchangeably used as typicality mea-
sures (for typicality II). Finally, two theorems were presented, showing that
if systems are ergodic (for typicality I) or epsilon-ergodic (for typicality II),
the typicality measure is unique (for typicality I) or unique from a pragmatic
perspective (for typicality II).
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11 Appendix
11.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First of all, consider:
if λ(A) > 0, then there is a p ∈ P with p(A) > 0. (17)
Later in the proof the result is needed that condition (17) is implied by the
condition that if A is an open set, there is a p ∈ P with p(A) > 0. This follows
because if λ(A) > 0, A contains an open subset O with λ(O) > 0 (since λ
is regular). Second, note that (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE) is a dynamical system. µE is
defined as:
µE(A) =
∫
A
| ∇xH |−1 dλ/
∫
ΓE
| ∇xH |−1 dλ. (18)
Hence it follows (from the Radon-Nikodym theorem) that µE  λ. Let
α = minx(|∇xH |−1)/
∫
ΓE
|∇xH |−1 dλ, α > 0 (the minimum exists because
ΓE is compact). Then if µE(A) = 0, 0 = µE(A) ≥ α
∫
A
dλ = αλ(A), and
hence λ(A) = 0. Therefore, also λ  µE. Thus it suffices to focus on the
case where a dynamical system (X,ΣX , φt, µX) is given where µX  λ and
λ µX .
The definition of a dynamical system requires that µX is invariant, and hence
µX satisfies Premise 1. Next, assume that p(A) = 0 for all probability distri-
butions of interest for some measurable A. Then also λ(A) = 0 (from Premise
2 and condition (17)). Because µX  λ (from Premise 6), µX(A) = 0. Con-
sequently, µX satisfies Premise 3. Note that Premise 4 is equivalent to the
claim that p  T for all probability distributions p of interest. Because
λ  µX (from Premise 6), p  µX for all probability distributions of in-
terest (from Premise 2). Thus µX satisfies Premise 4. Because µX satisfies
Premises 1, 3 and 4, it is a typicality measure (from Premise 5).
Let T be another typicality measure. Then λ  T (from Premises 2 and 4
and condition (17)). If λ(A) = 0 for some measurable A, then p(A) = 0 for
all probability distributions of interest (from Premise 2), and if p(A) = 0 for
all probability distributions of interest, T (A) = 0 (from Premise 3). Hence
T  λ. Therefore, T (A) = 0 iff λ(A) = 0. Because λ(A) = 0 iff µX(A) = 0
(from Premise 6), T (A) = 0 iff µX(A) = 0. Hence any other typicality
measure T will agree with µX about which sets are typical.
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11.2 Proof of Theorem 2
First of all, consider:
if λ(A) > Ψ, then there is a p ∈ P with p(A) > Ψ. (19)
Later in the proof the result is needed that condition (19) is implied by the
condition that if λ(A) > Ψ for an open set A, then P includes an initial
probability distribution p with p(A) > Ψ. This follows because if λ(A) > Ψ,
then there is an open subset O of A with λ(O) > Ψ (since λ is regular).
Second, note that (ΓE,ΣΓE , φt, µE) is a dynamical system. Vranas (1998)
has already shown that λ is ε/ξε-continuous w.r.t. µE for any ε ∈ (0, 1) and
for ξ = maxx(|∇xH |)/
∫
ΓE
|∇xH |−1 dλ (the maximum exists because ΓE is
compact). Let λ(A) ≤ ε, ε ∈ (0, 1). Then from equation (18) it follows that
µE(A) ≤ χ
∫
A
dλ = χλ(A) ≤ χε for χ=maxx(|∇xH |−1) ∗
∫
ΓE
|∇xH |−1 dλ
(the maximum exists because ΓE is compact). Hence µE is ε/χε-continuous
w.r.t. λ. Thus it suffices to focus on the case where a dynamical system
(X,ΣX , φt, µX) is given with µXβλε1 and λε4µXβ.
Premise 1∗ holds because for a dynamical system µX is invariant. Next,
assume that p(A) ≤ ε2 for all probability distributions of interest for some
measurable A. Then λ(A) ≤ ε2 (from Premises 2∗ and condition (19)).
Hence µX(A) ≤ β (from Premise 6∗), and µX satisfies Premise 3∗. Premise
4∗ is equivalent to the claim that pe3  Tβ for all probability distribution of
interest. Suppose that µX(A) ≤ β. Then λ(A) ≤ ε4 (from Premise 6∗) and
p(A) ≤ ε2 +(ε4−ε1) ≤ ε3 (from Premise 2∗). Therefore, µX satisfies Premise
4∗. Because µX satisfies Premises 1∗, 3∗ and 4∗, it is a typicality measure
(from Premise 5∗.
Let T be another typicality measure. If T (A) ≤ β, then λ(A) ≤ ε3 (from
Premise 2∗ and 4∗ and equation (19)). Thus, µX(A) ≤ β + (ε3 − ε2) (from
Premise 6∗). Conversely, if µX(A) ≤ β, λ(A) ≤ ε4 (from Premise 6∗). Hence
p(A) ≤ ε2+(ε4−ε1) for all probability distributions of interest (from Premise
2∗), and T (A) ≤ β+(ε4−ε1) (from Premise 3∗). Consequently, pragmatically
speaking, µX and T can be interchangeably used as typicality measures.
30
11.3 Proof of Theorem 3
As for the reasons given when proofing Theorem 1, it suffices to focus on
the case where a dynamical system (X,ΣX , φt, µX) is given where µX  λ
and λ  µX . According to a theorem in ergodic theory, if (X,ΣX , φt, µX)
is ergodic and T is a measure invariant under the dynamics with T  µX ,
then T = µX (cf. Cornfeld et al. 1982). Any other typicality measure T is
invariant (from Premise 1). Also, T  λ (from Premises 2 and 3), λ  µX
(from Premise 6), and hence T  µX . Consequently, T = µX .
11.4 Proof of Theorem 4
As for the reasons given when proofing Theorem 2, it suffices to focus on the
case where a dynamical system (X,ΣX , φt, µX) is given where µXβλε1 and
λε4 µXβ. According to a theorem by Vranas (1998), if (X,ΣX , φt, µX) is
β-ergodic, T is invariant and Tβ+ε4−ε1  µXβ, then µX and T are ε6-close
with θ = 2(β + ε4 − ε1) + β/(1− β). Let T be any other typicality measure.
Then T is invariant (from Premise 1∗). Also, λε4  µXβ (from Premise 6∗),
Tβ+(ε4−ε1)  λε4 (from Premises 2∗ and 3∗), and hence Tβ+(ε4−ε1)  µXβ.
Consequently, µX and T are θ-close.
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